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Introduction  
Germany has had a Turkish community since 1961, when the Federal 
Republic ratified a bilateral treaty to recruit guest-workers from Turkey. 
Although this community has long been a part of Germany’s social 
landscape, Turks have remained mostly detached from the German polity 
(Ögelman et.al., 2002: 147) as it was expected that these migrant Turkish 
labourers would return to their home country. Following the economic 
recession of the late 1960s, recruitment was banned in 1973. At the same 
time, however, the introduction of the 1973 family reunification law allowed 
Turkish immigrants to bring their spouses and non-adult children to 
Germany. In this way, the German government wanted to restrict the influx 
of more foreign workers while facilitating the integration of existing ones 
(Yükleyen and Yurdakul, 2011: 68). Although immigrants constitute more 
than ten percent of Germany’s population (Yurdakul, 2006: 439), Germany 
still does not define itself as a ‘country of immigration’.  
Immigrant organisations have a crucial influence on the political 
behaviour of immigrants in host societies (Vermeulen and Berger, 2011: 
160), such that state institutions increasingly cooperate with them to 
legitimize their own immigrant policies (Amelina and Faist, 2008: 96). One 
important question is whether organizations founded by second or third 
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generation immigrants can still be regarded as immigrant organisations. 
Indeed, they are generally defined as ‘ethnic’ rather than ‘immigrant’ 
organisations (Vermeulen, 2005: 21-22). Turkish community organisations 
are transnational, having contacts with political representatives in both 
Turkey and Germany. Thus, they may act as a ‘bridge’ between Turkey and 
Germany, and regarding Turkey-EU relations. The German public and its 
politicians have mostly viewed Turkey’s EU membership through the lens of 
the Turkish immigration experience in Germany (Humphrey, 2009: 142). 
Specifically, as Stelzenmüller (2007: 105-106) argues, this debate is closely 
linked with Turkish immigrants and German identity. It is claimed that it is 
more challenging to integrate Turkish immigrants than other immigrant 
groups both because Turkish immigrants constitute the largest group, and 
because of many cultural and religious differences from the host society 
(Kaiser Pehlivanoglu, 2002: 55).  
This article first presents the historical background of Turkish 
immigrants. Secondly it analyses the role of civil society in Germany, 
particularly the role of community organisations. Lastly, it explains the 
historical background and various types of Turkish community organisations 
in Germany and their role in Germany are evaluated. Two interviews were 
conducted in Berlin in September 2012. One of the interviewees was Rupert 
Strachwitz, who is studying on German civil society and currently working 
as a Director of Maecenata Institute of Humboldt University. Another 
interviewee was Suat Bakır, who is a Chairman of Turkish German Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (TD-İHK). 
 
Historical Background of Turkish Community in Germany 
As already mentioned, Turkish immigration to Germany began in 
1961, following the signing of the labour recruitment agreement between the 
two countries (Sezgin, 2011: 237). A recruitment ban was implemented after 
the oil crisis in the early 1970s. Currently, Turkish immigrants are the largest 
immigrant group in Germany, with 2.5 million individuals. During the early 
1980s, Germany’s Christian-Democrats (CDU/ CSU) in particular exploited 
anti-foreigner sentiments, running a national election campaign warning 
about ‘overforeignization’ and calling for a reduction in non-EU foreigners. 
This contributed to the alienation of German-Turks (Ögelman et al., 2002: 
156).  
Unfortunately, German-Turks continue to be misrepresented in both 
Germany and Turkey, despite their transformation and upward mobility they 
have experienced over the last 50 years. Among Turks, they are usually 
referred to as Almancı (‘German-like) or ‘gurbetçi’ (emigrant)49 (Kaya and 
                                                 
49 The term refers to someone in the diaspora, away from one’s homeland. 
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Kentel, 2005: 8), while in official German discourse they are usually referred 
to as ‘gastarbeiter’ (guest-worker) or ‘auslander’ (foreigner). However, 
Turkish immigrants in Germany no longer wish to be called immigrants as 
many are German citizens or have permanent resident status. Therefore, in 
this article they are referred to as ‘German-Turks’. As Kaya and Kentel 
(2005: 3) argue, today’s German-Turks have little in common with the old 
‘guest-worker’ stereotypes of the past, having become a highly active part of 
the population. Another factor is that while these immigrants were 
previously seen as Turks, they became Muslim after the attacks on the USA 
on September 11, as the immigration debate shifted from a cultural to a 
religious focus (Mudde, 2012) in Europe. 
Citizenship sets out the rights and obligations of individuals 
identified as members of a society. There are two main types of citizenship: 
the ethno-cultural and civic understandings.50 The ethnic model is based on 
the principle of descent, referred to as the ‘jus sanguinis’ principle, which 
makes it very difficult for immigrants to gain access to the political 
community.51 Germany before 2000 was the main example of this model of 
citizenship. In order to receive German citizenship, an applicant had to 
provide evidence of at least one German ancestor (Yurdakul, 2006: 438). In 
contrast, the civic model provides easy access to naturalisation through the 
‘jus soli’ principle.52 The SPD attempted to reform citizenship rights by 
introducing this principle into German citizenship law, with a new 
citizenship law coming into force on 1 January 2000 that partially changed 
the principle of descent. According to this law, children born in Germany to 
foreign nationals will now receive German citizenship so long as one of the 
child’s parents has resided lawfully in Germany for at least eight years and 
holds entitlement to residence or has held an unlimited residence permit for 
at least three years. In most cases, such children also acquire their parents’ 
citizenship, although they have to opt for one of their two nationalities before 
they become 23. Since the introduction of this new citizenship law, the 
number of foreigners applying for naturalisation has greatly increased. Kaya 
and Kentel (2005: 10-12) argue that this partial introduction of the principle 
of jus soli indicates that the definition of Germanness is no longer limited to 
ethnic descent, and that ethnically non-German individuals can be 
                                                 
50 For further detail, see Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham, “ Migration and Ethnic 
Relations as a Field of Political Contention: An Opportunity Structure Approach” in Ruud 
Koopmans and Paul Statham (eds.), Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics,  
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p.30. 
51 For further detail, see Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and 
Germany, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992. 
52 For further detail, see Adrian Favell, Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the 
Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1998. 
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incorporated into the political sphere through civic channels. Since 2000, the 
political environment for the Turkish community has changed. In Berlin, for 
example, multicultural practices have slowly become institutionalized in 
local integration policies (Vermeulen and Stotjin, 2007; cited in Vermeulen 
and Berger, 2011: 161). 
Most German political parties are receptive to the participation of 
German-Turks, especially the SPD and the Greens. German-Turk politicians 
like Cem Özdemir, who has participated in local and federal German 
politics, express their opinions about immigrant rights, integration, and 
foreign policy (Ögelman et al., 2002: 155), while political parties have 
developed initiatives to increase communication with voters from different 
minority groups. For example, a German-Turkish forum was established by 
the SPD, which led the CDU to set up a similar forum (DTF, Deutsch-
Turkische Forum) to make the party more attractive to voters with a Turkish 
background (Kaya, 2011: 503-504). The German-Turkish Forum, which tries 
to bring Turkish immigrants and the CDU closer together, supports EU 
membership for Turkey. This forum argues that if German and Turkish 
cultures were incompatible with each other, it would be useless to try to 
integrate people of Turkish descent into German society (Böttger and Maggi, 
2009: 39-44). 
Because of the low level of political opportunities for German-Turks, 
they have to develop alternative ways for participation, such as through civil 
society. Firstly the role of civil society in Germany is discussed below. 
 
The Role of Civil Society in Germany 
German civil society has a long tradition, growing rapidly during the 
late 18th and 19th centuries (Berman, 1997: 1-11). It became divided along 
different socio-cultural lines, particularly Catholic versus social democratic. 
During the 1970s, new types of associations were established, focusing on 
specific issues, such as the environment. The reunification of Germany led to 
new opportunities and challenges for German civil society (Reimer, 2005: 
15).  
In the USA, civil society has tried to maintain a distance from the 
state, whereas the opposite can be observed in France, where power was 
concentrated in Paris after the 1789 French revolution. Germany represents a 
middle position between these two models. In Germany, civil society 
developed relatively recently with the rise of Prussia, and restarted in the 
Federal Republic of Germany after World War II. In the last decade 
especially, citizen participation and voluntary work have been increasingly 
promoted by politicians, with all of the major parties agreeing with this 
process (Anheier, 2009). Civil society in Germany is primarily financed by 
the state, although civil society organisations (CSOs) can usually act 
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independently of the state, with no direct control being exerted on them. 
However, the foundations under civil law are subject to the state’s legal 
supervision. CSOs are consulted by the Bundestag (federal parliament) or 
Landtage (state parliaments), and they involve in several commissions 
preparing legislation (Reimer, 2005: 26-47). 
There are few foundations in East Germany, reflects the population 
sizes in different federal units, although another factor is that civil society 
has only recently been introduced in East Germany, since 1989. In contrast, 
the high density of CSOs in some West German states is the consequence of 
their historical background, such as the presence of a strong bourgeoisie and 
the important role of the church and local authorities (Reimer, 2005: 23). 
According to the CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI), conducted in 
Germany from 2003 to 2005, political rights, confidence in the rule of law, 
decentralisation, socio-economic environment and financial support to CSOs 
by the state were all rated as excellent (Reimer, 2005: 10). According to 
CIVICUS, the impact of civil society on politics, society and economy in 
Germany is rather high (Reimer, 2005: 53).  
CSOs influence media framing and agenda setting of political issues, 
affecting how domestic debates are framed in Germany. The main division is 
between large, well-resourced CSOs and small, single-issue, financially 
weak ones (Lang, 2000: 386). Germany’s most influential interest groups 
have been labour unions, welfare organizations and employers associations 
(Ögelman et al., 2002: 155). Strachwitz (2012) argued that business 
organisations in particularly are much more influential in German politics 
than CSOs. He also notes that, according to German law, parliament must 
hold hearings with relevant organisations in any law-making process and 
CSOs are registered at the parliament. Lobbying also takes place at state as 
well as federal level. In December 2006, the German Federal Minister of 
Finance stated that ‘the state needs civil society’, admitting that the 
government depends on CSOs to fulfil its obligations towards its citizens 
(Strachwitz, 2011).  
Although the corporatist elements in the German system, such as 
trade unions, churches, welfare organizations and business organisations, 
provide opportunities for class and religious interests to participate in public 




                                                 
53 Yasemin Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in 
Europe, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. Cited in Pontus Odmalm, “Turkish 
Organizations in Europe: How National Contexts Provide Different Avenues for 
Participation”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 10, No.2, June 2009, p.155. 
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Immigrant Organisations in Germany 
Immigrant organizations have four main functions. First they can act 
as links between the sending and receiving countries, providing advisory 
services for future immigrants, and giving them an intermediary role in a 
complex bureaucracy. They can also help soften the shock of transition by 
offering a setting in which immigrants can meet fellow nationals and speak 
their native language. They can maintain interaction among immigrants, 
especially for those who lack informal ties, and may try to form formal ties 
to develop some form of bonding. Second, they can complement the state in 
integrating newcomers into the host society. If organisations can establish 
well-functioning relationships with the authorities responsible for integration 
policies, then they can facilitate integration. This can include providing 
native-language information about the host country or acting as a link 
between immigrants and different socioeconomic sectors of the host society 
and its political world. They can also be used as a ‘training school’ for 
further political participation. Third, if they are part of an established 
network, immigrant organisations can act as a unified force in support of 
their particular ethnic group in relation to the host society. The extent that 
immigrants cluster in organizations is an important indicator of the strength 
of their collective identity. The character, number and size of organizations 
indicate the extent that immigrants prefer to see themselves as different or be 
seen by others as different. That is, these organizations can be viewed as an 
expression of the collectively-felt identity of their members. This may be 
defensive, in response to exclusion, or offensive, which stems from 
immigrants choosing to set themselves apart from others. Thus, there is a 
distinction between organizations that prefer to reinforce the group’s ethnic 
identity and those that encourage integration. Immigrant organizations can 
also play an important role to establish links between the ethnic group and its 
country of origin, and serve as contact points between ethnic communities in 
different settlement countries, such as those among Turkish communities in 
different European countries (Odmalm, 2009: 158). Schoeneberg (1985: 419) 
argues that whether immigrant organisations have predominantly segregative 
or integrative effects depends mostly on the basic activities they offer to their 
members, and on the position they take towards the rest of society. They may 
direct their organizational efforts towards the preservation of traditions and 
the defence of their culture of origin from the influences of the host society, 
or help and encourage their members to relate to members of the host 
society. 
Access and cohesion are crucial factors in understanding the 
influence of the immigrant community on policy making at the national 
level. Immigrants have the potential to influence their host country’s 
policies, including its foreign policy. However, this potential can only be 
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realized if the immigrant community is large enough, has access to political 
power and speaks with a single voice (Ögelman et al., 2002: 162). Ögelman 
et al. (2002: 145-147) argue that two factors limit the political power of 
immigrant groups regarding policy-making in the host country. The first is 
their cohesion, which depends on organizational and material capabilities. 
The second is whether the group’s access to political power is determined by 
the host society’s political institutions. In countries that facilitate the 
acquisition of citizenship and grant immigrants participatory rights, those 
immigrant groups that are large, homogeneous and well-organized, have 
greater influence over their host country’s foreign policy. Ögelman et al. 
(2002) also note that, if immigrant preferences differ from those of the host 
population, then immigrant influences on foreign policy can be significant. 
 In Germany, immigrant organizations have defended immigrant 
rights vis-à-vis German political parties and local and the federal German 
state authorities. As a result, Germany’s institutions have gradually begun to 
take these organizations seriously and consider them as representative and 
consultative bodies in immigrant issues (Yurdakul, 2006: 436). Thus, the 
institutions of the majority society search for ways to work together with 
immigrant organizations because they recognize their influence in 
transforming immigrant communities (Yükleyen and Yurdakul, 2011: 70). 
However, immigrant organizations in Germany have not been given 
any special role in the formulation of integration policy, and formal links 
with organizations are not well established. Instead, labour unions and 
churches play a more prominent role than immigrant organizations. Although 
few provisions exist for the collective participation of immigrants at a federal 
level, there are crucial differences at the local level. Moreover, there is a high 
degree of variance in terms of funding for immigrant organizations, which 
again often relates to the attitude of the local government (Odmalm, 2009: 
155).  
In the next section the role of Turkish community organisations in 
Germany will be discussed. 
 
The Role of Turkish Community Organisations in Germany 
As mentioned earlier, for a long time, German citizenship policies 
made it almost impossible for immigrants to naturalize and become part of 
the political community. This lack of formal opportunities led immigrants to 
develop a more civil society-orientated means of participation (Odmalm, 
2009: 154). As Kaya and Kentel (2005: 10) argue, in response to Germany’s 
exclusionary auslander status attitude towards Turkish immigrants, the latter 
have tended to develop strong ethnic structures. In addition, the lack of 
political participation and low level of representation in Germany has made 
them direct their political activity towards Turkey, which has also received 
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encouragement from Turkey in the form of networks of consular services 
and other official religious, cultural and educational organisations. 
Ostergaard-Nielsen (2000: 23-38) argues that the way in which Turks 
organize has not only depended on Germany’s institutions, but is also related 
to Turkish immigrants’ socioeconomic position, developments in Turkey, 
and developments in Turkey-EU relations.  
Although the German institutional context has not effectively 
channelled Turkish community into German organizations, it has permitted 
immigrants to develop their own organizations. There are several indigenous 
German organizations relevant to Turkish incorporation. Organizations such 
as the auslanderbeirate were created by the government to represent 
immigrant interests, while civil organizations such as wohlfahrtsverbande 
have an official mandate to represent the interests of various immigrant 
communities. German political parties constitute another organizational 
medium through which immigrants can negotiate the terms of their 
incorporation, although the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Republikaner 
and the Deutsche Volksunion parties refuse to include immigrants because of 
strategy (Ögelman, 2003: 173-175). 
The Turkish community in Germany offers the most diverse and 
fragmented organisations. During the early to mid-1960s, they avoided 
organized political activity. But as temporary guest-worker programmes led 
to settlement, Turkish immigrants started to express diverse political 
identities and engage in group activities. The resulting internal divisions over 
goals and strategies weakened the Turkish community’s potential (Ögelman, 
2003: 166-167). By the 1980s, the Turkish network of organizations had 
become the broadest of all immigrant groups in Germany, although it was 
more polarized along political lines than any other ethnic group network. 
While religious and conservative groups did not engage in political activities, 
more leftist organizations participated in politics, both in West Germany and 
Turkey. Leftist groups also promoted cooperation with German 
organizations, particularly with the unions. Both the polarization of Turkish 
politics and the ethnic fragmentation of Turkish society were reflected in 
Turkish community organizations in West Germany (Schoeneberg, 1985: 
424). Thus, Turkish community organizations in Germany display a vast 
variety of political backgrounds and affiliations, ranging from radical left 
and right-wing nationalist at each extreme to mainstream organizations. 
There are also religious organizations such as those of the Alevis. Turkish 
Sunnis have established several organizations favouring a secular form of 
Islam that has led to emergence of competing Islamist organizations.  
Whether Turkish community organizations are more engaged in 
homeland or host society issues has depended on the structural conditions 
and opportunities available for participation. Germany’s restrictive 
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naturalization laws have given rise to two types of political engagement, 
which are transnational activities or trying to improve immigrant status in 
Germany. Sometimes, local conditions allow for more inclusive participation 
in terms of cooperation with German authorities to improve immigrant 
integration (Odmalm, 2009: 159). Turkish immigrants have established 
several CSOs in Germany focusing on cultural, political and social issues. In 
particular, assistance organizations, hometown associations, women, student, 
parent organizations and professional organizations, such as workers, 
businessmen and teachers associations have also been established (Sezgin, 
2011: 237). 
Two of the main problems of immigrants concern equal opportunities 
in employment and education. In order to deal with these problems, federal 
and local state institutions provide funding for projects undertaken by 
immigrant organizations, such as job training projects, neighbourhood centre 
projects for educational facilities, and consultation offices that help 
immigrants with bureaucratic problems, such as immigration status or 
banking and credit problems. As a result, many Turkish community 
organizations conduct their projects only with the funding they receive from 
state institutions. The German state authorities perceive these organisations 
primarily as social service providers rather than political interest groups 
(Yurdakul, 2006: 439-440). 
According to Sezgin (2011: 239-243), most Turkish community 
organizations try to preserve the identities of their members, as stated in the 
statutes of more than half of them, while some try to preserve Turkish culture 
and traditions in Germany. Another crucial aim is the integration of the 
Turkish community in Germany. Usually, Turkish community organizations 
keep direct or indirect ties with their counterparts or certain political parties 
in Turkey. They usually mobilize around homeland political agendas and 
express their thoughts about Turkish foreign policy. Many of them transfer 
and attract remittances to Turkey. A limited number of Turkish community 
organizations provide financial assistance to some Turkish CSOs in Turkey. 
The Turkish community in Germany politically incorporates 
immigrants into the host society through their organizations, shaping the 
integration patterns of the community while also transforming the majority 
society (Yurdakul, 2009: 2-7). The main goal of these organizations is to 
provide greater social justice for immigrants in German society. They 
emphasize the voting power of immigrants, demanding minority rather than 
immigrant rights, while standing against assimilation. Turkish immigrants 
mobilise politically through their ethno-national organizations to challenge 
German citizenship regulations and negotiate their membership. German 
political parties, particularly the Social Democrat Party (SPD) and the 
Greens, support immigrant organizations and immigrant representatives that 
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help provide an environment for immigrants to organise, mobilise and state 
their demands to the German state. Thus, they have become involved in the 
political decision-making process. However, while these organizations may 
act as representative bodies of the community, they do not have full 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the German authorities (Yurdakul, 2006: 437-
439).  
As already mentioned, these community organisations are not 
homogeneous, with diversities among immigrant groups developing and 
intensifying through interaction with the political organisations of the 
receiving society. These organisations are different in terms of their 
background, strategy and goals, while participating in politics and 
negotiating their positions (Yurdakul, 2006: 449). In accordance with the 
dominant class cleavage in Germany, Turkish community organizations on 
the left, especially Social Democratic ones, have established close links with 
the SPD, which enables them to get more state funding than more 
conservative and transnational-oriented organizations. The presence or lack 
of several opportunities for political engagement provides them with certain 
political ways by which they define their goals and strategies in relation with 
regards to the host society (Odmalm, 2009: 157). As Yurdakul (2009: 2-12) 
argues, Turkish community organizations are not passive recipients of the 
German state’s political decisions; rather, they are active political agents in 
the political system that develop their own patterns of integration depending 
on their interactions with the receiving state. They try to integrate into the 
majority society in their own ways, rather than in ways imposed on them by 
state authorities. The members of these organizations wish to be accepted as 
citizens through civic participation that transforms both their own 
communities and the civic traditions of the host country. Apart from these 
groups, Turkish immigrant elites have become important political actors in 
negotiating rights and membership for their own community, also sometimes 
for other minorities and disadvantaged groups. 
 
Types of Turkish Community Organisations in Germany 
Religious Organisations of Turkish Community in Germany 
Because Islam is not recognized as an official religion in Germany, it 
has been very difficult for Turkish religious organisations to participate in 
the political system (Vermeulen and Berger, 2011: 169). Islamic religious 
organisations do not have the legal status of a corporation under public law, 
unlike Christian churches and the Jewish community. Instead, they are 
considered as private organisations without legal standing (Jonker, 2000). 
Furthermore, due to national, ethnic and intra-Islamic religious differences, 
no umbrella organisation exists to represent German Muslims (Kogelmann, 
1991: 315-336).  
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The main religious organisations of the Turkish community in Germany and 
their main goals and functions are explained below. 
 
Turkish-Islamic Union of the Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet 
İşleri Türk İslam Birliği- DITIB) 
DITIB was established in 1983 as a result of the Turkish parliament’s 
decision to set up religious centres for Turkish immigrants in Europe. It is 
commonly believed to be the formal representative of the Turkish state 
institution, the Directorate of Religious Affairs. However, its members 
emphasise that they only have an informal agreement. Imams funded by 
Turkey are sent to Germany, while other activities include youth groups, 
mosque or women’s groups that are funded by associational resources. They 
are careful not to make any statements that would offend official relations 
between Turkey and Germany, but aim to maintain the loyalty of German-
Turks to Turkey. Diyanet’s ‘official Islam’ calls for the integration of 
German-Turks without losing their Turkish national identity. Germany 
cooperates with the Diyanet because it has the largest network of mosques, 
but it would prefer the development of home-grown Islamic organizations 
(Yükleyen and Yurdakul, 2011: 70-71). It is the largest Muslim umbrella 
organisation in Germany, incorporating 870 mosque associations, and one of 
the most important Turkish organisations in Germany. The Turkish 
government coordinates DITIB’s activities through the religious attaché of 
the Turkish embassy. The Turkish state also trains all DITIB administrators 
and religious scholars (Ögelman et.al, 2002: 151). There has been close 
cooperation between DITIB and other Islamic organizations in Germany 
since 2001. It has participated in the ‘Islamic Conference’ organized by the 
German Federal Home Office since 2006. The first Islamic conference 
united various Muslim organisations into one contact organisation called the 
‘Coordination Committee of Muslims’. DITIB also participated in the 
‘Integration Summit’ initiated by the Federal Home Office in 2006. The aim 
of this meeting, which included representatives of both the German 
authorities and immigrant organisations, was the development of a ‘National 
Integration Plan’ (Amelina and Faist, 2008: 97-98) because Germany has 
focused on the formation of a German Islam in order to domesticate Islam 
and Muslims. One of the key aspects of this strategy is to promote DİTİB as 
the representative of moderate Islam in Germany. The official appointment 
of DİTİB as the sole representative of Muslims in Germany at the Integration 
Summit of 2006 excluded opposition Turkish groups and Muslims with non-
Turkish national origins (Humphrey, 2009: 144).   
In September 2006, the German Islam Conference (DIK) created a 
new broader national forum to represent Muslims in Germany with the goal 
of promoting a German Islam. DIK was composed of five main Muslim 
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organisations: DİTİB, Islam Council, Central Council of Muslims, Union of 
Islamic Cultural Centres and ten ministerial appointees. Since the 
introduction of DIK, Germany’s dependence on DİTİB as the main 
representative of German Islam has decreased, with DİTİB being seen as too 
conservative and closely tied to the Turkish state. DIK’s central aim is the 
national domestication of German Islam as moderate to contain Islamic 
extremism. In 2007, some Turkish community organisations boycotted the 
Integration Summit because they regarded the 2005 Immigration Law, which 
made immigration conditional on a capacity to integrate, as discriminatory 
against Turkish immigrants, particularly in terms of language and marriage 
(Humphrey, 2009: 144).   
 In short, until 1998, the German state’s perspective was that Germany 
was not a country of immigration so Turkish Islam only had a temporary 
presence. After the securitisation of Islam after 2001, DİTİB was perceived 
as the face of moderate Islam and the main representative of German Islam. 
However, after Merkel came to power, the domestication of Islam took a 
different direction with the introduction of the Integration Summits and DIK. 
The new goal is to design a German Islam by Germany, rather than 
designing of Islam in Germany by Turkey (Humphrey, 2009: 150-151). 
 
Islamic Community Milli Görüş (IGMG)   
Apart from DITIB, one of the other most important Turkish religious 
organisations in Germany is the Turkish-Sünni Islamic Community Milli 
Görüş. It is part of the Islamic Council, which participates in the Islamic 
Conference (Amelina and Faist, 2008: 99-100). It is a diaspora network of 
Turkish Muslims in Europe, especially in Germany. Having different 
political ideologies, Diyanet and Milli Görüş do not collaborate. Milli Görüş 
is usually considered as part of political Islam, seen as preventing 
immigrants from integrating into German society (Yükleyen and Yurdakul, 
2011: 72). In its official website IGMG is defined as an Islamic community 
which comprehensively organises the religious lives of Muslims. The IGMG 
addresses all issues regarding Muslims while at the same time representing 
their interests. The goal of the IGMG is to improve the living circumstances 
of Muslims and to protect their fundamental rights. 
 
Alevitic Community Germany (Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu- 
AABF) 
The AABF was founded by seven Alevitic associations in 1991 to be 
the central community of the Federation of Alevitic Communities of Europe 
(Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Konfederasyonu-AABK) (Amelina and Faist, 2008 
:100). It is the main umbrella organisations of Alevis in Germany. It includes 
130 local organisations which has 100.000 members. It was established 
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without any pioneer organisation in Turkey. It participates in German Islam 
Conference and German Integration Summit. Some of its main goals are 
revival of Alevi in Turkey and Germany, supporting interreligious dialogue 
and cooperation, education on anti-discrimination and human rights, 
professionalization of immigrant organisations and increasing their quality 
and to increase dialogue and cooperation among Turkish cultural and 
religious communities in Germany and Europe (website of AABF). 
 
Turkish Business Organizations in Germany 
Association of Turkish Entrepreneurs and Industrialists in Europe 
(Avrupa Türk İşadamları ve Sanayicileri Derneği- ATIAD) 
ATIAD has a crucial role in organisation and institutionalisation 
process of Turkish business world in Germany and Europe.  Its primary 
activity fields include encouraging Turkish people who live in Germany and 
other member states of EU to entrepreneurship, to contribute to economic 
relations between Turkey and Germany, to contribute to solve education 
problems of Turkish community in Germany, to prevent unemployment 
among Turkish community and to support Turkey’s membership to the EU 
(Website of ATIAD) ATIAD functions as a bridge between Germany, 
Turkey and the EU through its members’ economic relations between Turkey 
and Germany, as well as between Turkey and other EU countries. Turkey’s 
EU membership bid is supported by the ATIAD in various forms, including 
establishing contacts with German, Turkish and EU politicians, by producing 
position papers reflecting the position of ATIAD, and by written contact with 
Turkish, German and European politicians (Amelina and Faist, 2008 : 106). 
 
German-Turkish Chamber of Industry and Commerce (Türk-Alman 
Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası- TD-İHK) 
Established in 1994, this organization is a counterpart of the German-
Turkish Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Turkey. While the latter 
represents the interests of German enterprises in Turkey, TD-İHK represents 
the interests of Turkish enterprises in Germany (Amelina and Faist, 2008: 
108). The Turkish Chairman of TD-İHK, Suat Bakır (2012), argued that 
business organizations are very influential in German politics, noting that 
TD-İHK is working for the interests of both Germany and Turkey. He stated 
that his organization was primarily lobbying for visa facilitation for Turkish 
businessmen, adding that TD-İHK’s short-term goal is abolition of the visa 
requirement, with Turkey’s EU membership as a longer-term goal.  
In addition to these associations, another umbrella organisation of the 
Turkish community in Germany is the Turkish Community in Germany 
(Almanya Türk Toplumu- TGD), founded by the union of several other 
umbrella organisations in Hamburg in 1995. Its main aim is to represent the 
European Scientific Journal October  2014 edition vol.10, No.29  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
85 
interests and demands of Turkish immigrants to German national institutions. 
It declares its goal as ‘better communication between the German and 
Turkish nation by supporting cultural exchange, youth welfare, as well as 
education and occupational training’ (Cited in Amelina and Faist, 2008: 
103). It claims to be ‘independent of political and religious ideologies and 
autonomous from associations with conservative, liberal, social-democratic 
or religious orientations’ (Cited in Amelina and Faist, 2008: 103). TGD 
issues press releases, and organises PR campaigns, public conferences and 
other events. One of its current aims is the replacement of Germany’s ‘policy 
on foreigners’ with a ‘policy of equality’. In addition to requests for 
recognition addressed to the German government authorities and the public, 
TGD also demands dual citizenship for immigrants, and the establishment of 
German-Turkish European schools in other federal states, like the ones in 
Berlin (Amelina and Faist, 2008: 104). 
As Vermeulen and Berger (2011: 161) argue, membership in Turkish 
community organizations has had a positive influence on Turkish 
immigrants’ degree of political participation in the host society. Those 
German-Turks who are active in these organizations are more likely to 
respond proactively to political issues at a national level.  
 
Conclusion 
Although the Turkish community is large in Germany, its influence is 
limited because of the low education levels of the community. In addition, 
the Turkish community in Germany is not monolithic but highly fragmented 
and polarised, which means Turkish community organisations are often 
unable to work together effectively to reach common goals, such as for 
greater political empowerment or dual citizenship (Ögelman et.al., 2002: 
152).  
Through their organizations, German-Turks try to persuade German 
policymakers to adopt their policy preferences. A semi-corporatist social 
contracting between the state and leading institutions that is rooted in 
German political culture dominates domestic politics. Thus, immigrant 
organizations have to face crucial obstacles to lobbying in Germany, 
regardless of their organizational capabilities, unless the state privileges their 
members through incorporation schemes. Without such privileged access, 
immigrants can exert little influence over German foreign policy; even they 
are large in number, well organized and cohesive in their demands. Turkish 
community organisations in Germany have various policies concerning 
Turkey. Islamist German Turks would prefer to orient Turkey more towards 
fellow Muslim countries, while Kurds, Alevis and other minorities among 
German-Turks support the implementation of the EU’s human rights criteria 
in Turkey as a condition for Turkey’s membership to the EU. However, these 
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diverse preferences and interests of various parts of Turkish community 
reduce their ability to play any crucial unified role in forging German foreign 
policy towards Turkey. German politicians usually seem to be ignorant about 
the foreign policy preferences of Turkish immigrants, who are not mobilized 
as an effective lobby to make their voices heard in Germany (Ögelman et al., 
2002: 146- 157). As a result, the German polity and the Turkish divisiveness 
constrain the political influence of German-Turks. German-Turks have 
limited access to German politics, and the German-Turkish community is 
fragmented, so their influence on German foreign policy has been almost 
nothing.  
 Turkish community organisations in Germany can play a crucial role 
both in integrating Germany’s Turkish immigrants and contributing to solve 
the sociocultural and economic problems of Turkish community. Turkish 
community organisations in Germany are highly polarised ideologically, 
which makes it hard for them to act together for common goals. In order to 
be more influential in German politics, they have to be professionalized, and 
they have to cooperate more with German and Turkish CSOs. Turkish 
community organisations in Germany primarily have to cooperate more with 
each other by overcoming their ideological rivalries in order to find solutions 
for their common socio-economic problems, to contribute integration of 
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